Civil Practice by Carlisle, Jay C.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace




Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, jcarlisle@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 65 (1993), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/24/.
CIVIL PRACTICE 
Jay C. Carlisle? 
During the 1992 Survey year, "new" legislation was enacted 
which fundamentally changes the procedure for commencement of 
some lawsuits.1 Effective December 31, 1992, all civil actions in 
supreme and county courts must be commenced by filing a summons 
and complaint or summons with notice.2 Several important amend- 
ments to the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") were enacted3 
and effective January 1, 1993, new IAS4 and escrow check bouncing5 
rules became effective. Additionally, there have been significant devel- 
opments in the decisional law of statute of  limitation^,^ discovery,' 
sanctions,$ and the legal professiong. These and other areas should be 
of interest to the bench and bar. 
7 Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Adjunct Professor of New 
York Civil Practice, Fordham Law School and New York Law School; J.D., University 
of California at Davis; A.B., University of California at Los Angeles; Member, New York 
Bar. 
This article is dedicated to Professor Hervey M. Johnson and to Jeffrey Brown, Esq. 
Both died during the 1992 Survey year. Professor Johnson was a founding member of the 
Pace University School of Law faculty. He graduated from Princeton and was an editor 
of the Duke Law Review prior to practicing law as an associate at the New York firm of 
Davis, Polk & Wardwell. Hervey was a wonderful law teacher and our students consist- 
ently rated him as one of our best professors. His courses in Constitutional Law and 
Contracts were favorites of thousands of Pace Law School students. Jeff Brown was an 
outstanding law student at Pace Law School and an outstanding lawyer at the New York 
City law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. Jeff was the chief assistant to Robert Macrate 
when he was president of the American Bar Association. The fact that Jeff died so soon 
after his graduation from law school reminds us that life is fragile. The students, faculty, 
deans and alumni of Pace Law School salute Hervey Johnson and Jeff Brown. We miss 
them very much. 
1. See infra notes 62-99 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 12-23 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 100-188 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 238-240 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra notes 261-295 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 296-31 1 and accompanying text. 
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I. NEW LEGISLATION AND RULES 
Space limitations prevent inclusion of an appendix summarizing 
all CPLR legislation enacted during the Survey year. The reader 
should review the table of contents for the various CPLR publica- 
tions.10 The most important change is the adoption of a new filing 
law for all civil actions in supreme and county courts.ll Prior to dis- 
cussing these changes, the bench and bar should be alerted to the fol- 
lowing statutory and rule changes. 
A. New IAS Rules Efective January 1, 1993 
A series of changes in rules and operations of the Individual As- 
signment System ("IAS") became effective January 1, 1993.12 The 
changes will provide judges with more case-management powers13 
and encourage them to experiment with IAS rules.14 The new rules 
require that preliminary conferences occur within forty-five days of 
the filing of a request for judicial intervention, unless the parties com- 
plete and submit an agreed upon discovery schedule on a form order 
prior to the conference.15 Also, unless the judge determines that cir- 
cumstances require settlement or an order, decisions will be self-effec- 
tuating in nature.16 The rules and operational changes recommended 
will be implemented in accordance with plans submitted by the ad- 
ministrative judges and approved for each judicial district in the 
10. The complete text should be available for review in the 1992-93 publications by 
Matthew Bender ("The Red Book"), Gould Publications ("The Black Book") or West's 
McKinney Commentaries. Copies of the entire legislative texts may be obtained by con- 
tacting the Department of Governmental Relations. The practitioner should also con- 
sider subscribing to the Annual Legislative Bulletin of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York. The Bulletin analyzes the merits of the proposed bills and discusses 
their impact on current laws. I t  is an excellent research tool and will keep the reader 
abreast of current developments in Albany. 
11. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
12. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, 5 208.8 (effective Jan. 1, 1993) 
(amending 5 202.8 of the Uniform Civil Rules for the supreme and county courts, relat- 
ing to motion procedure). 
13. See Martin Fox, Rules Changes for IASSystem Eflective Jan. I ,  N.Y. L.J., Dec. 
14, 1992, at 1. 
14. Id. at 2. (Chief Administrator of the Courts Matthew T. Crosson states the 
changes "will increase the court system's ability to deal with the overwhelming number 
of matters that come before it every day . . . [and] will also serve to strengthen the Indi- 
vidual Assignment System by making case processing procedures more uniform and 
understandable." 
15. N.Y. UNIFORM RULES OF THE COURT 5 202.12(b) (McKinney 1993). 
16. Id. 
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state.17 Plans have been made for an IAS Committee "to monitor and 
review the progress and effectiveness" of the new rules on a regular 
basis and to issue its first monitoring report on or before May 1, 
1993.18 Operational changes include informal motion practices such 
as telephone conferences,lg the development of specialized commer- 
cia120 and matrimonial parts,21 block conference scheduling,22 and re- 
finement of existing methods of trial as~ignment.~3 Copies of the 
implementation plans for each judicial district should be obtained by 
members of the bar. 
B. New Escrow Check Bouncing Rules 
During the Survey year important amendments to rules and regu- 
lations governing the maintenance of lawyer trust and escrow bank 
accounts have been enacted.24 Among the changes, which are effective 
January 1, 1993, are amendments to Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 9-102 
of the Lawyers' Code of Professional Resp~nsibility.~s The new rules 
require that attorneys and law firms use only banks that have agreed 
to report dishonored checks to attorney disciplinary committees.26 
The rules are applicable to special, trust, escrow, and IOLA accounts. 
The Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection will periodically publish a 
list of participating banks. There will be three designations for client 
- - - 
17. Plans for the Ninth Judicial District and for the First Judicial District have 
already been published and distributed to the bar. (Copies on file with the Syracuse Law 
Review in the Barclay Law Library). 
18. See Fox, supra note 13, at 2. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. ' m e  use of specialized parts will increase, particularly with the establish- 
ment of four specialized commercial parts in New York County on Jan. 1, and the addi- 
tion of more specialized parts exclusively for matrimonial cases." 
22. Cases will be scheduled for conferences in blocks of time at intervals during the 
day. This will decrease waiting time for lawyers and litigants and will replace the former 
method of scheduling, where a large number of cases were scheduled to be heard at the 
same time on a single day. 
23. See Fox, supra note 13, at 2. "Based on a district-by-district review of current 
caseloads, administrative judges, on an approved local option basis, will adopt or refine 
existing methods of trial assignment, including dual-track (the assignment of back-up 
judges for trial-ready cases if the IAS judge is unavailable) and the use of Trial Assign- 
ment Parts (in which all trial-ready cases are pooled and sent out to available judges for 
trial).'. 
24. See STATE BAR NEWS, December 1992, at 12, col.1. 
25. N.Y. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI?Y 
DR 9-102 (1993). 
26. See STATE BAR NEWS, supra note 24, at 12. 
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and escrow accounts. Attorneys and law firms must choose one for 
each account and have the title placed on their checks and deposit 
slips. The titles are "Attorney Trust Account," "Attorney Special 
Account," and "Attorney Escrow Account." 
The new escrow rules provide for a dishonored check notice pro- 
cedure.27 If a check written on one of the designated accounts 
bounces for lack of funds, a notice will be sent by the bank to the 
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection. The Fund will hold the check 
for ten days in case the notice was sent in error by the bank. Even if 
the lawyer deposits money to cover the check, the notice won't be 
withdrawn unless the bank was in error. Finally, after expiration of 
the ten day period, the Fund will forward the notice to the appropri- 
ate disciplinary committee, based on the attorney or law firm's ad- 
dress. The Committee will then conduct an investigation and may 
order an audit.28 
C Attorney Fees Against the State 
The New York State Equal Access to Justice Act was perma- 
nently enacted during the Survey ~ e a r . ~ 9  The law creates a mecha- 
nism authorizing the recovery of counsel fees and other reasonable 
expenses in certain actions against the State of New York. It is simi- 
lar to the provisions of federal law contained in 28 U.S.C. section 
2412(d) and the significant body of case law that has evolved thereun- 
der. Awards are limited to cases where the state cannot show that its 
position is "substantially justified."30 Fees will be determined pursu- 
ant to prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services 
furnished, except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a 
party for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unrea- 
sonably protracted the  proceeding^.^^ 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See Act of March 31, 1992, ch. 36, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 61 
(codified at N.Y. STATE E ~ U A L  ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT 5 1, 2 (McKinney Supp. 
1992)). , ,
30. Id. See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (fees under similar federal 
statute could be awarded only if an agency had proceeded when there was no fair ground 
for litigation). 
3 1. See Act of March 31, 1992, supra note 29. See also Gary Spencer, Cuomo Signs 
Bill Authorizing Awards of Fees Against State, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 27, 1989, at 1. 
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D. Recovery of Attorney Fees and Damages in SLAPP Suits 
Effective January 1, 1993, a new section 70-a has been added to 
the New York State Civil Rights Law.32 This authorizes claimants 
who are subject to a SLAPP suit to claim costs, attorney fees, other 
compensatory damages, and punitive damages. A claimant must fit 
within the definitional section of section 76-a of the Civil Rights 
L a ~ . 3 ~  
E. Civil Justice Expense and Reduction Plans 
We again remind federal litigators that new civil justice expense 
and reduction plans were enacted several weeks prior to the beginning 
of the 1992 Survey year. On December 12, 1991, the Civil Justice 
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan was adopted by the Board of 
Judges of the Southern District of New York. On December 17, 
1991, a similar plan was adopted by the Board of Judges of the East- 
ern District of New York. The plans were discussed in last year's 
Survey of Civil Practice.34 Copies of the plans are available in the 
appropriate federal court clerk's office and are "must reading" for 
anyone contemplating litigation in the Eastern or Southern Districts. 
I? Signz3cant CPLR Changes 
During the Survey year there were thirty-six section or rule 
changes to the CPLR. Some of the important changes are listed be- 
low. The practitioner is reminded to review the table of contents for 
the various CPLR publications to note changes that may be relevant 
to his areas of interest.35 
I. CPLR 213-b 
CPLR 213-b was added to provide that a crime victim may com- 
mence a civil action for damages against a person convicted of a crime 
within seven years of the date of the crime. This provision became 
effective on July 24, 1992.36 
32. See Act of August 3, 1992, ch. 767, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 2103 
(codified at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 5 70-a (McKinney Supp. 1992)). 
33. Id. (codified at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS 5 76-a (McKinney Supp. 1992)). 
34. See Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey of N. Y. Law, 43 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 77, 96-101 (1992). 
35. See supra note 10. 
36. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 213-b (McKinney Supp. 1992). 
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2. CPLR 214-~(1) 
CPLR 214-c(1) was amended to broaden the definition of "expo- 
sure" to include exposure by implantation. The amendment became 
effective on July 24, 1992, and is good news for plaintiffs who seek to 
use New York's new discovery accrual statute of limitations in sub- 
stance cases.37 
3. CPLR 307(2) 
CPLR 307(2) was amended to add a provision authorizing per- 
sonal service upon specified state agency officers by certified mail, re- 
turn receipt requested. The provision became effective January 1, 
1993, and requires that the envelope containing process bear the leg- 
end "URGENT LEGAL MAIL."38 Failure to strictly comply with 
the statute may result in a dismissal in supreme and county courts. 
Dismissal in the inferior courts will be for lack of jurisdiction and if 
the statute of limitations has run, the action will be time-barred.39 
4. CPLR 3405 
CPLR 3405 was amended to provide that the rules promulgated 
by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the arbitration of cer- 
tain claims may authorize use of judicial hearing officers as arbitra- 
tors. The rule became effective April 10, 1992.40 
5. CPLR 3407 
CPLR 3407 relates to preliminary conferences in personal injury 
actions involving certain terminally ill parties. It was enacted by 
chapter 582 of the Laws of 1992 and became effective September 1, 
1992. Lawyers representing clients who are terminally ill and who 
allege their illness is the result of the culpable conduct of another 
party to the action "may request an expedited preliminary 
~onference."~~ 
37. N.Y. CPLR 214-c(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
38. N.Y. CPLR 307(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992). 
39. Id. 
40. See Act of April 10, 1992, ch. 55, 1992 N.Y. Laws 55 (codified at N.Y. CPLR 
340(s)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992)). 
41. See Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 582, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 1614 
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 3407 (McKinney Supp. 1992)). 
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6. CPLR 87 
Effective April 10, 1992, Chapter 55 of the Laws of 1992 added 
Article 87 to the CPLR.42 The provisions of the Article shall expire 
and be deemed repealed on April 1, 1994.43 The new provision is 
entitled "Punitive Damage Awards: Public Share." It provides that 
in any civil action resulting in an award of punitive damages to a 
private party, other than an award rendered against the state, upon 
expiration of the time to appeal or the exhaustion of available appeals, 
twenty percent of such punitive damages award shall be payable to 
the state, and the judgment shall order payment a~cordingly.~~ 
G. The New Filing Law 
During the Survey year a new mandatory filing law was enacted 
for civil actions commenced in supreme and county courts after De- 
cember 31, 1992.45 The legislation includes changes in CPLR 203, 
205, 207, 304, 305, 306-a, 306-b, 312-a, 1007, 1101, 1319, 6213, and 
7102. It also provides for changes in the Uniform District Court 
the New York Civil Court Act,47 the Uniform City Court 
Act$* the Uniform Justice Court Act,49 the Domestic Relations 
Law," the General Municipal Law,Sl the Navigation Law,52 the 
Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation Law,53 and the Vehicle 
and Traffic Law.54 Professor Siege1,ss Professor Professor 
42. See Act of April 8, 1992, ch. 55, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 324 
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 8701-8704 (McKinney Supp. 1992)). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Act of June 23, 1992, ch. 216, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 835 (codi- 
fied at N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney Supp. 1992)). 
46. N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT $401, et seq. (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992). 
47. N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT $ 400 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1992). 
48. N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT $5 400m, 409m, 411 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 
1992). 
49. Id. $ 400 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992). 
50. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 21 1 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992). 
51. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW $ 504-a (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992). 
52. N.Y. NAV. LAW $5 48, 74 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992). 
53. N.Y. PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAW $ 25.27 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 
1992). 
54. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW $253 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992). 
55. See David D. Siegel, Imminent New Filing System Threatens Viability of Civil 
Lawsuits, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Imminent New Filing]; David D. 
Siegel, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., NOS. 390, 391, 395 and 396. See also DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW 
YORK PRACTICE (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1992). 
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Barker,57 Professor Shapir~,~* Professor Carpinello,59 and other@ 
have written on the new filing law. In addition Bert Bauman, Esq., 
and the New York State Trial Lawyers Institute have published a use- 
Eul "Quick Tip" dige~t.~l Professor Farrell, who authored the Survey 
of Civil Practice for ten years prior to the current author, has pro- 
vided very helpful written comments regarding the legislative changes 
in rules affecting commencement of actions in supreme and county 
courts. The new rules are highlighted as follows: 
I.  In General 
Prior to July 1, 1992, satisfaction of the statute of limitations was 
inextricably linked to service of the summons and complaint or sum- 
mons and notice upon the defendant.62 Failure to comply strictly 
with New York service statutes would result in a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction and if the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff did 
not get the benefit of a six month extension under CPLR 205(a).63 
Effective September 1, 1991, CPLR 306-a required that the summons 
and proof of service be filed with the clerk of the court within thirty 
days after service was complete.64 The statute applied to actions com- 
menced in the supreme or county courts, including third party ac- 
tions.65 It was designed to raise revenue, but many lawyers did not 
comply with the statute and the legislature was forced to pass Chapter 
216 of the Laws of 1992, which establishes mandatory filing require- 
- - 
56. See Marc M. Arkin, New York's New Commencement By Filing Law, Special 
Alert Available from Matthew Bender (an analysis of practice under Chapter 216 of the 
Laws of 1992). 
57. See Robert A. Barker, Provisions of The New Filing Law, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 
1992, at 3. 
58. See Fred L. Shapiro, Commencement by Filing Legislation, 19 WESTCHESTER 
BAR J. 303 (Fall 1992). 
59. See Carpinallo, The Commencement-by-Filing Law (written remarks before 
New York State Trial Lawyers Institute) (copy on file in Barclay Law Library). 
60. See James N. Blair and Paul H. Aloe, New Commencement by Filing Law: A 
Practitioner's Survival Guide, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 1992, at 1. 
61. See Bert Bauman, New Commencement By Filing Law, (written remarks before 
New York State Trial Lawyers Institute) (copy on file in Barclay Law Library) and 
NYSTLA QUICK TIP (written analysis of commencement of a special proceeding in 
supreme and county courts of New York) (copy on file in Barclay Library). 
62. See Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey of A! I: Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 63, 89-94 (1990). 
63. See Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1988 Survey of N. I: Law, 40 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 77, 101-108 (1989). 
64. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey, supra note 34, at 78. 
65. Id. 
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ments for all civil actions in supreme and county The new 
legislation also seems to apply to actions filed in the surrogate's 
but actions in other courts, including the court of claims, 
must be commenced by service of process upon the defendant.68 The 
new statutory scheme became effective July 1, 1992, and applies to 
civil actions and proceedings commenced thereafter. There was a 
transitional provision which permitted commencement of all civil ac- 
tions by service of process on the defendant until December 31, 
1992.69 If the filing fee required by CPLR 306-a was not paid by De- 
cember 31, 1992, the "old style" action was deemed dismissed with- 
out prejudice. In this respect, the practitioner should note 
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. R o o ~ e v e l t , ~ ~  where 
Justice Joan Lefkowitz authorized the late filing of a summons be- 
cause the filing fee had been paid in 1992.71 
2. Summary of Changes 
(a) CPLR 203 
The applicable statute of limitations stops running in supreme 
and county court civil actions when the summons and complaint or 
summons and notice is properly filed with the clerk of the court.72 
The plaintiff, or his representative, must pay $170 for the index fee, 
obtain a receipt, and be sure the summons indicates the index number 
assigned and the date of filing. If "circumstances prevent filing," e.g., 
the clerk's office is closed, new CPLR 203(c)(2) provides that signing 
of a judge's order will mark commencement of the action if the order 
is filed within five days.73 REMEMBER, under the new filing law, 
66. See Imminent New Filing, supra note 55, at 1. 
67. See id. 
68. Id. 
69. See id. 
70. 154 Misc. 26 336, 593 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. Rockland Co. 1993). 
71. Id. at 336, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Plaintiff started an action on August 14, 1992, 
and defendant defaulted. Plaintiff wanted to enter a default judgment but had failed to 
file the summons and proof of service. Plaintiff had purchased an index number in 1992 
and moved for a nunc pro tunc order of filing. The Supreme Court pointed out that prior 
to December 31, 1992, one could commence an action without filing of summons and 
complaint or summons and notice with the Supreme Court. The issue was whether plain- 
tiff's application was subject to the new law. Justice Lefkowitz authorized the late filing 
because the fee was paid in 1992, which met the implicit effective date requirements.). 
72. See N.Y. CPLR 306-a (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
73. See N.Y. CPLR. 203(c)(2) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
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CPLR 203(b)(5)74 no longer governs supreme and county court ac- 
tions but it is applicable in other courts.75 
(b) CPLR 205 
CPLR 205 codifies the applicable case law. There is no six 
month extension if a civil action fded in supreme or county court is 
dismissed for failure to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant.76 How- 
ever, CPLR 306-b(b) allows the plaintiff to commence a second action 
within 120 days after an automatic dismissal for failure to fde "proof 
of service" or within 120 days after a jurisdictional dismissal.77 
(c) CPLR 304 
An action in the supreme or county court is commenced by the 
filing of a summons and complaint or summons with notice with the 
clerk of the A special proceeding is commenced by filing of a 
notice of petition or order to show cause with the clerk together with 
the $170 index fee.79 As noted under CPLR 203, a court order may 
establish the commencement date if circumstances prevent filing.80 
(d) CPLR 305 
The summons must indicate the index number assigned and the 
date of filing. The third-party summons must also indicate the date of 
filing. If the summons is served without the index number and date of 
filing, it may be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.81 
(e) CPLR 306-a; CPLR 1007 (third party actions) 
Third party actions require filing the summons and complaint or 
summons with notice and paying the $170 fee under CPLR 8018.82 A 
74. See id. 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
75. Id. 
76. See sources cited supra note 55. 
77. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b@) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
78. See id. 306(a) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
79. See sources cited supra note 55. 
80. See N.Y. CPLR 203(c)(2) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
81. I t  is possible the court will consider a summons served without the index 
number and date of filing on it a mere "irregularity" that can be cured, but why take the 
chance? 
82. See N.Y. CPLR 1007 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1992). 
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third party action requires payment of an additional fee but no new 
index number will be assigned.83 
Cf) CPLR 306-b 
Within 120 days from the date plaintiff files the summons and 
complaint or summons and notice, he must also file proof of service.84 
If the plaintiff fails to do so, the complaint is automatically dismissed 
without prejudice and without c0sts.8~ The defendant cannot waive 
the filing requirement.86 If the statute of limitations is four months or 
less, i.e., Article 78 proceedings, proof of service must be filed not 
later than fifteen days after the statute of limitations expires.87 
If the action was timely commenced but dismissed "for failure to 
effect proper service," i.e., failure to file proof of service within the 
first 120 days, or failure to make proper service pursuant to the strict 
compliance requirements in New York, plaintiff may refile and receive 
another 120 days to complete the service. If service is not made dur- 
ing the first 120 days, the original action is deemed dismissed and the 
second 120 days starts immediately upon the date the action is auto- 
matically dismissed.88 If service was attempted but "improper" for 
failure to comply with New York's strict compliance requirements, 
the second 120 days starts from the dismissal "despite the expiration 
of the statute of limitations after commencement of the original 
action."s9 
Thus, if a tort action with a three year statute of limitations ac- 
crued on April 1, 1990, and the plaints files a summons and com- 
plaint or summons and notice on March 30, 1993, the action is timely. 
However, plaintiff must properly serve defendant and file proof of ser- 
vice within 120 days from March 30, 1993. Assume plaintiff purports 
to serve defendant on May 1, 1993, and files proof of service on that 
date. Defendant answers on June 1, 1993, and raises the affirmative 
defense of improper service. Plaintiff does not move to strike the de- 
fense and the court decides service was improper (no jurisdiction) on 
83. Id. 
84. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
85. Id. 
86. See sources cited supra note 55. 
87. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b@) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
88. See id. 306-b (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
89. Id. 
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June 1, 1996! Plaintiff has 120 days from that date to commence a 
new action, properly serve the defendant and file proof of service. 
3. Procedural Steps 
First: Prepare the summons with notice or summons and 
complaint as you would ordinarily, except the 
summons should provide for entering the index 
number and the date of filing. 
Second: Go to the Clerk's office with copies of the papers 
prepared in step one. 
Third: File the papers. When filing with the $170 fee for 
the index number be sure to ask the clerk for a 
receipt and a copy of the papers date-stamped. If 
the clerk advises that he will stamp and file the 
papers at a later date, inform him politely that it is 
extremely important for you to have the papers 
date-stamped immediately. Failure to do so could 
result in a clerical filing error that might cause your 
papers to be filed after the statute of limitations has 
run. This could result in a dismissal on statute of 
limitations grounds. Also, if there are two or more 
clerks of the court, be sure to file with the proper 
clerk. If you are not sure, file with both clerks.90 
Fourth: Enter the index number and date of filing on the 
summons to be served upon the defendant(s). 
90. See David D. Siegel, The Filing System That Takes Over On Janualy 1, 1993, 
Part III, N.Y.  ST. L. DIG., NO. 395 (1992). Professor Siegel discusses who is "the clerk 
of the court." He reminds us that by statute it is the county clerk who is the clerk of both 
the supreme court and the county court in her county. See N.Y. COUNTY LAW $5 525, 
909 (McKinney 1991 and Supp. 1993). However, in some places the supreme court and 
county court have separate nonjudicial officers who do the filing for those courts. Their 
offices may even be separated geographically. Professor Siegel suggests: "To be sure of 
satisfying both the practicalities and the technical law, we've heard some lawyers say that 
they file initiatory papers with both, when there are separate offices." Siegel, supra. 
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Fifth: Serve the defendant(s) within 120 days of the filing 
in step three. REMEMBER that New York 
decisional law requires STRICT COMPLIANCE for 
service of summons and complaint or summons and 
notice. Failure to strictly comply with the service 
statutes may result in a jurisdictional dismissal. The 
dismissal is not fatal because plaintiff will have 
another 120 days from the date of dismissal to 
commence a new action and make proper service, 
but who wants to do that? 
Sixth: File proof of service within 120 days of the filing. 
4. New York Rule Dzrers From Federal Practice 
Lawyers should note the following important differences between 
federal filing requirements and the New York filing requirements. 
First, in federal court actions the defendant must be served within 120 
days from the date the summons and complaint is filed, but proof of 
service can be made thereafter. CPLR 306-a requires both filing, ser- 
vice, and proof of service within the 120 day period. Also, in federal 
practice the clerk of the court issues the summons. Second, under 
federal law the 120 day service requirement is not applicable if service 
is made on a defendant in a foreign country. New York's new filing 
law does not provide for this exception. Third, Rule 6 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to enlarge the 120 day 
peri0d.9~ The New York law contains no such provision. 
How will the New York filing law affect federal diversity actions? 
In these actions timely service for limitations purposes must be mea- 
sured by state, rather than federal law on the authority of Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp.92 Can the practitioner rely on the 120 days of 
CPLR 306-b, or the 120 days of Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure? Professor Siegel suggests "[a] better answer than the 
right answer is to take steps that would satisfy both of them."93 
5. Impact on Provisional Remedies 
The new laws do not affect provisional remedies but the practi- 
tioner should remember that in attachment practice, service must be 
91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6. 
92. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
93. See David D. Siegel, Filing System, Part IV, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., No. 396 (1992). 
Kudos to Professor Siegel for his four digest articles discussing the new filing laws. 
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made within the sixty day period required by CPLR 6213. Also, in lis 
pendens cases, under CPLR 65 12 the technical effectiveness of the no- 
tice provided by a notice of pendency depends on service within 30 
days after filing. 
6. Default Judgements 
Assuming proof of service is filed within the 120 period following 
filing, the new scheme does not appear to impact on default judg- 
ments, except that a defaulting defendant, who has a valid claim that 
jurisdiction was not obtained, may get out from under the default 
under CPLR 5015(a)(4). In this situation, the plaintiff would be free 
to take advantage of CPLR 306-b, possibly at a dramatically long de- 
lay from the commencement of the original action. 
Z RJI Forms 
Requests for Judicial Intervention ("RJI") are not affected by the 
new legislation. Remember that under the new IAS rules, effective 
January 1, 1993, preliminary conferences will occur within forty-five 
days of the filing of an RJI, unless the parties complete and submit an 
agreed-upon disclosure schedule on a form order before the 
conference.g4 
8. Matrimonial Actions 
Matrimonial actions are commenced by filing, and not service. 
Although the new laws contain minor amendments to Domestic Rela- 
tions Law 2ll,95 it should be noted that statute of limitations 
problems seldom occur in matrimonial matters. 
9. New Rules Not Applicable in Inferior Courts 
The Uniform District Court Act, the New York City Civil Court 
Act, the Uniform City Court Act, and the Uniform Justice Court Act 
specifically state the new filing laws do not apply in district, city, civil, 
and justice courts.96 Also, the new laws do not apply in the Court of 
Claims.9' Thus, the practitioner must remember that in these courts 
the statute of limitations will be stopped only by properly making ser- 
94. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
95. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 211 (McKinney 1988 62 Supp. 1992). 
96. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
97. See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT 5 10 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992). 
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vice of summons and complaint or summons and notice on the de- 
fendant. If the plaintiff fails to do so and the statute of limitations has 
expired, the action is dismissed and plaints will not be allowed to 
recommence it.g8 
10. Problem Areas (What zLf Things Go Wrong?) 
(a) Single Defendant Lawsuits 
CPLR 306-b(a) and (b) must be read together because, even if 
the plaintiff fails to comply with the 120 day requirement of subsec- 
tion (a), he still has a second bite at the apple. The following exam- 
ples illustrate how the new scheme works. 
EXAMPLE I 
The summons and complaint are filed on April 1, 1993, the day 
the statute of limitations expires. The 120 day period within which to 
serve defendant and file proof of service runs out on August 1, 1993. 
If proof of service is not filed, or if defendant does not appear, or if 
defendant is not served by August 1, 1993, (and proof of service made 
on that date) the action is "deemed dismissed." But, according to 
CPLR 306-b(b), plaintiff has 120 days from August 1, 1993 (or until 
December 1, 1993)' to file a "new" summons and complaint or sum- 
mons and notice, purchase a "new" index number, properly serve the 
defendant, and file proof of service in the "new" action against the 
defendant. 
EXAMPLE II 
As in Example I, filing occurs on April 1, 1993. The process 
server subsequently returns with an affidavit of service, which indi- 
cates that service was made on June 1, 1993. Proof of service is filed 
within a few days after plaintiff's lawyer receives the affidavit. De- 
fendant makes a timely motion before Justice S to dismiss, correctly 
showing (as it turns out) that service was botched. Justice S's calen- 
dar rules are such that the motion is not heard until August 1, 1993 
and not decided until December 1, 1993, when by decision order Jus- 
tice S dismisses the action. CPLR 306-b(b) allows plaintiff 120 days 
from December 1, 1993 (or until April 1,1994), to file a summons and 
98. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey, supra note 34, at 123. 
Heinonline - -  44 Syracuse L. Rev. 79 1993 
80 Syracuse Law Review pol .  4465 
complaint or summons and notice, serve the defendant and file proof 
of service in a "new" action against the defendant. 
EXAMPLE III 
As in Example I, filing occurs on April 1, 1993. The process 
server makes service by leave and mail, or nail and mail under CPLR 
308 and returns with an affidavit of service which indicates that the 
leave or nail was completed on July 15, 1993, and the mailing was 
completed on July 25, 1993. CPLR 308(2) and (4) require that proof 
of service be filed with the clerk of the court designated in the sum- 
mons within twenty days of the mailing. Does the plaintiff have until 
August 5, 1993, to file proof of service or does the 120 day period in 
CPLR 306-b(a) govern and require plaintiff to file proof of service by 
August 1, 1993? If plaintiff fails to make proof of service by August 1, 
1993, the action will automatically be deemed dismissed. Plaintiff will 
then have to file a "new" action, purchase a new index number, and 
start over again. 
(b) Multi-Defendant Lawsuits 
In multi-defendant lawsuits, filing with the clerk of the court will 
satisfy the statute of limitations as to all defendants, but proof of ser- 
vice must be filed within 120 days as to each defendant who has not 
appeared. The action is "deemed dismissed" as to any defendant who 
has not been served, and as to whom proof of service has not been 
filed, by the end of the 120 day period. The examples above also serve 
to illustrate the consequences of dismissal as to one of several co-de- 
fendants. Note that when a "new" action is commenced as to the co- 
defendant, separate actions (the original action plus the "new" action) 
exist. As a consequence, assuming the "new" action satisfies the 
CPLR scheme, plaintiff should make a motion to consolidate the orig- 
inal and "new" actions. 
Finally, mention should be made of the obvious fact that judicial 
interpretation will be crucial to the application of the new filing laws 
and until decisions are rendered the practitioner should proceed with 
caution.99 Also, it would appear that defendants draw no terminal 
99. See Farmer v. King, No. 17618 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. Oct. 14, 1992). In 
Farmer, petitioner timely began a proceeding by filing an order to show cause and peti- 
tion to challenge the result of a primary election. The petition was dismissed for failure 
to effectuate it within the time required by the order to show cause. Within fifteen days 
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advantage from successfully challenging the adequacy of service in 
supreme and county court civil actions because of the grace period 
provided by CPLR 306-b(b). However, "hardball" defendants can be 
expected to file CPLR 321 1(a)(8) defenses. Similarly, there seems to 
be no reason for the plaintiff to appeal a trial judge's grant of a motion 
to dismiss for lack of proper service because commencement of a 
"new" action would solve the problem considerably faster and 
cheaper than an appeal. We thank Professor Farrell for his thought- 
ful input on the new filing law. 
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals issued at least 
three important statute of limitations opinionsl* and one opinion re- 
garding the timely filing of a notice of claim.101 Also, several appel- 
late divisions issued opinions worthy of mention.lo2 
A. Court of Appeals 
I.  CPLR 203(b) Interposition of Claim and the "United In 
Interest" Doctrine 
In Mondello v. The New York Blood Center,l03 the Court of Ap- 
peals examined and clarified the "united in interest" doctrine pro- 
vided for in CPLR 203(b).l04 This is a relation back rule which 
provides, in pertinent part, that a "claim asserted in the complaint is 
interposed against the defendant or co-defendant united in interest . . . 
when . . . the summons is served upon the defendant . . . . "10s The 
appellate division, in Brock v. Bua,lo6 gave the rule a three-prong 
specificity, patterned largely after the federal "relation back" test 
from the dismissal, petitioner began a new proceeding by filing a second order to show 
cause with the clerk. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition as time barred and the 
petitioner opposed the motion based upon the fifteen day extension required by CPLR 
306-b(a). Justice Ingrassia granted a motion to dismiss. He reasoned that election cases 
have a statute of limitations of only ten days and that the extension sought by the peti- 
tioner was one and one-half times greater than the statute of limitations and that to hold 
otherwise would frustrate the clear intention of the election law. 
100. See infra notes 103-157 and accompanying text. 
101. See infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text. 
102. See infra notes 168-180 and accompanying text. 
103. 80 N.Y.2d 219, 604 N.E.2d 81, 590 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1992). 
104. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
105. Id. 
106. 83 A.D.2d 61, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407 (2d Dep't 1981). 
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codified in Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.107 The 
Brock test examines whether (1) both claims arose out of the same 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence; (2) the new party is united in 
interest with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship 
can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that 
the new party will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the 
merits by the delayed, otherwise stale commencement; and (3) the 
new party knew or should have known that, but for an excusable mis- 
take by the plaintiff in originally failing to identify all the proper par- 
ties, the action would have been brought against the additional party 
united in interest as well.108 All three features must be met for the 
statutory relation-back remedy to be operative. log 
The Mondello case originated with the deaths, apparently of 
complications from AIDS-related diseases, of an infant child in late 
1986 and her mother in early 1987. In 1984, the mother received 
intravenous transfusions of apparently HIV-infected blood. Her wid- 
ower instituted an action in 1987 against defendant-appellant New 
York Hospital ("Hospital") and several physicians on behalf of him- 
self and his deceased spouse's and daughter's estates. After some dis- 
covery, the 1987 complaint was amended in 1989 to add the New 
York Blood Center ("Blood Center") as a defendant. The Court of 
Appeals noted that the controversy was "still at its early but critical 
motion stages"ll0 and framed the issue as to "whether the wrongful 
death causes of action against the Blood Center were started too late 
and are thus time barred."lll The Court stated, "[u]nless the defend- 
ant Hospital and putative defendant Blood Center are 'united in inter- 
est' within the meaning of CPLR 203(b) and Brock v. Bua,l12 the 
wrongful death causes of action against the party added in 1989, de- 
fendant Blood Center, are concededly untimely and cannot be related 
back to the timely commenced action against defendant Hospital."llJ 
The supreme court had dismissed those causes of action against the 
Blood Center which sounded in strict product liability and breach of 
warranty but declined on prematurity grounds to dismiss causes 
107. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) 
108. Brock, 83 A.D.2d at 69, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 412. 
109. See id. 
110. See Mondello, 80 N.Y.2d at 223, 604 N.E.2d at 83, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
111. Id. 
112. 83 A.D.2d at 61, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 407. 
113. Mondello, 80 N.Y.2d at 223, 604 N.E.2d at 83, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
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against the Blood Center sounding in negligence for loss of services 
and for conscious pain and suffering. These were deemed governed by 
the "toxic substance" discovery rule of CPLR 214-c and, thus, addi- 
tional disclosure would be necessary to ascertain the dispositive dis- 
covery date.114 
The Court of Appeals noted that the only part of the supreme 
court's ruling before it was the dismissal of the wrongful death causes 
of action against the Blood Center on statute of limitations 
grounds."S The supreme court had explained that the two year bar of 
Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") section 5- 4.1 would apply 
to those actions, unless plaintiff could demonstrate that the Blood 
Center and the Hospital were united in interest within the meaning of 
CPLR 203(b). The supreme court "concluded, however, that the Hos- 
pital and Blood Center were 'at aost  joint tortfeasors and not parties 
united in interest.' "u6 The Appellate Division for the First Depart- 
ment reversed the dismissal of the wrongful death causes of action."' 
"It adopted and applied the relation back test formulated by the Ap- 
pellate Division, Second Department, in Brock v. Bua."l The Court 
of Appeals, by Judge Bellacosa, identified the second prong of the 
Brock unity of interest test as "the central dispositive focus of this 
appeal.""9 Judge Bellacosa reasoned that the appellate division had 
erred when it failed to address the question of whether "the facts of 
this case might present an exception to the general rule that parties 
are not liable for the negligence of independent contractors either be- 
cause plaintiff reasonably looked only to the Hospital for the perform- 
ance of the service . . . or because the harm caused arose from a 
danger inherent in the work."l20 Judge Bellacosa stated, "[wle find it 
necessary to address and resolve the latter questions because plaintiff 
now concedes that the regulation relied on by the parties and appel- 
late division up to this point in the litigation was not in effect at the 
relevant time at issue. It simply is not dispositive in this case."l21 
After a lengthy analysis with respect to vicarious liability, the Court 
reversed the appellate division and held that the interest of the Hospi- 
114. Id. at 22425, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
115. Id. at 225, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Mondello, 80 N.Y.2d at 225, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 225-26, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
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tal and the Blood Center in the subject matter was not such that they 
stood or fell together so that a judgment against one would similarly 
affect the other. 
2. CPLR 205(a): Six Month Extension Not Available in Court of 
Claims Action 
In Dreger v. New York State Thruway Authority,l23 the Court of 
Appeals again had an opportunity to address the question of what 
constitutes timely commencement for purposes of allowing a recom- 
mencement of an action under CPLR 205(a).124 In the principal case 
and two companion cases,12' counsel for plaintiffs had not strictly fol- 
lowed the Court of Claims Act procedure for filing a notice of claim. 
The Court of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, began by stating, 
"[iln each of these actions a claim against the State or the Thruway 
Authority was dismissed for failure to serve a copy of the claim on the 
Attorney General in the manner prescribed by the Court of Claims 
Act [section] 1 The Court noted that "in Dreger, the claimant 
served the Thruway Authority but neglected to serve the Attorney 
General. In the [companion cases], copies of the claims were mailed 
to the Attorney General but were not sent by certified mail as the 
statute requires. Because of these failures, the actions were subse- 
quently dismissed and time-barred."l27 The Court noted that "[tlhe 
Court of Claims Act contains no recommencement provision of its 
own, but [that] section lO(6) expressly incorporates the time limita- 
tions and tolling provisions of article 2 of the CPLR . . . . "128 The 
Court then stated, "[tlhus, these actions may be recommenced if they 
qualify for recommencement under CPLR 205(a)"129 and framed the 
question on appeal as "whether these claimants failed to meet the 
statutory timely commencement requirement because of their failure 
to serve the Attorney General properly."l30 The Court explained that 
122. Id. at 226, 604 N.E.2d at 85, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 23. 
123. 81 N.Y.2d 721, 609 N.E.2d 111, 593 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1992). 
124. N.Y. CPLR 205 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
125. See Charbonneau v. State & Dalton v. State, 81 N.Y.2d 721, 609 N.E.2d 1 1 1 ,  
593 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1992). 
126. Dreger, 81 N.Y.2d at 722, 609 N.E.2d at 1 1  1, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 758; see N.Y. 
CT. CL. ACT 5 11  (McKinney 1989). 
127. Dreger, 81 N.Y.2d at 722-23, 609 N.E.2d at 1 1  1, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 758. 
128. Id. at 723, 609 N.E.2d at 112, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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"Court of Claims Act, section 11 establishes a notice requirement in 
addition to that which may be applicable under other statutes."l31 It 
mandates serving a copy of the claim or notice of intention on the 
Attorney General, either personally or by certified mai1.132 The Court 
of Appeals further explained that "both filing with the court and ser- 
vice on the Attorney General must occur within the applicable limita- 
tions period, and there is no basis for believing that the Legislature 
intended filing to independently constitute commencement."~33 
The Court of Appeals concluded that "[blecause suits against the 
State are allowed only by the State's waiver of sovereign immunity 
and in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements condi- 
tioning suit must be strictly construed."134 The Court stated, 
"[a]ccordingly, where, as here, claimants have not met the literal re- 
quirements of Court of Claims Act § 11, their actions are not timely 
commenced, and relief under CPLR 205(a) is not available."l35 Then- 
Judge Kaye filed a strong dissent.136 She stressed that the Court of 
Appeals has long recognized that a CPLR 205(a) request to recom- 
mence a dismissed action must be liberally viewed.1S7 Judge Kaye, 
relying on the words of former Chief Judge Cardozo, argued that the 
"broad and liberal purpose" of CPLR 205(a) should not be "frittered 
away by any narrow construction."l3* She explained that the Court 
of Claims Act, in contrast to the CPLR, does not specify when an 
action is "commenced."l39 Thus, Judge Kaye concluded, 
In the CPLR, the Legislature chose to prescribe when an action is 
commenced, and those requirements must be literally satisfied 
before relief can be allowed under CPLR 205(a). The Legislature 
may well choose a parallel course for the Court of Claims Act. 
Unless and until it does so, however, this Court should not itself 
impose requirements that deny plaintiffs the intended benefit of 
CPLR 205(a). 
131. Id. at 724, 609 N.E.2d at 112, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759. 




136. Id. at 724-25, 609 N.E.2d at 112-13, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60. 
137. Dreger, 81 N.Y.2d at 724-25, 609 N.E.2d at 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Kaye, 
J., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 724, 609 N.E.2d at 112-13, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60. 
139. Id. at 725, 609 N.E.2d at 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 760. 
140. Id. 
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3. CPLR 208: Infancy Toll Not Applicable in Wrongful Death 
Action 
In Baez v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. ,141 the pri- 
mary issue presented was whether CPLR 208 applied to toll the stat- 
ute of limitations for commencing a cause of action for "wrongful 
death and conscious pain and suffering on behalf of infant benefi- 
ciaries where the decedent's will named plaintiff executrix of her es- 
tate and stated that plaintiff should be appointed guardian for her 
infant children."142 
On April 17, 1986, Rosa Caraballo died while receiving treat- 
ment at a hospital owned and operated by the defendant.143 Prior to 
her death she had executed a will naming her mother, Carmen Baez, 
executrix of her estate and guardian of her infant ~hi ldren .1~~ "On
October 7, 1986, testamentary letters were issued to Baez authorizing 
her to administer her daughter's estate."145 "Letters of guardianship 
for the decedent's two children were issued to Carmen Baez on No- 
vember 18, 1986."146 "On January 5, 1987 Carmen Baez, on behalf of 
the infants, filed a notice of claim for wrongful death and conscious 
pain and suffering against the defendant."147 On July 24, 1987, more 
than one year and ninety days after her daughter's death, Baez served 
a summons and complaint upon the defendant and started a second 
wrongful death case against two doctors who allegedly operated on 
the de~edent.14~ The supreme court denied a motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled until the 
date of the guardian's appointment.149 The appellate division re- 
versed the judgment and held that the limitations period began to run 
on the date of decedent's death rather than on the date of the appoint- 
ment of decedent's mother as executrix or guardian and, as there was 
an adult relative of the deceased who could have instituted the action 
on behalf of the decedent, a toll for infancy was unavailable.150 The 
141. 80 N.Y.2d 571, 607 N.E.2d 787, 592 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1992). 
142. Id. at 574, 607 N.E.2d at 787, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 640. 
143. Id. at 574-75, 607 N.E.2d at 788, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641. 
144. Id. at 575, 607 N.E.2d at 788, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641. 
145. Id. 




150. Baez v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 168 A.D.2d 529, 563 N.Y.S.2d 89 
(2d Dep't 1990). 
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appellate division granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal to the 
Court of Appeals.151 
The Court of Appeals pointed out that under the Estates Powers 
and Trust Law section 5- 4.1,152 personal representatives of a decedent 
have two years, measured from the date of death, in which to com- 
mence a wrongful death cause of action.153 The Court also noted that 
at the time the present litigation was commenced, a one-year and 
ninety day statute of limitations applied to actions brought against the 
defendant and its employees.154 The Court distinguished Ratka v. St. 
Francis Hospital,l55 and Hernandez v. New York City Health and Hos- 
pitals Corp. ,Is and stated: 
In this case, the decedent's will named plaintiff Baez executrix of 
her estate. Upon her daughter's death, plaintiff Baez could have 
timely sought appointment as a personal representative to com- 
mence the actions on behalf of the infant children and her failure 
to do so does not suspend the running of the applicable limitations 
period. The actions against defendants are untimely because they 
were not commenced until after the one year and 90-day statutory 
period had expired.15' 
4. Notice of Claim Dismissed for Failure to Comply With General 
Municipal Law 
In Pedrero v. Moreau,l58 the Court of Appeals, in a memoran- 
dum opinion, reversed the order of the appellate division and held 
that plaintiff had failed to follow the notice of claim procedure set 
forth in General Municipal Law 50-d(1).159 The Court explained that 
plaintiff, born June 3, 1970, commenced this malpractice action 
against six physicians for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a 
negligently-induced premature birth.160 "In 1982, a notice of claim 
was served upon the Comptroller of the City of New York, and in 
1983, the supreme court permitted plaintiff to serve late notice of 
151. Id. at 529, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 89. 
152. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 5 5-4.1 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1992). 
153. Baez, 80 N.Y.2d at 576, 607 N.E.2d at 788, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641. 
154. Id. 
155. 44 N.Y.2d 604, 378 N.E.2d 1027, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978). 
156. 78 N.Y.2d 687, 585 N.E.2d 822, 578 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1991). 
157. Baez, 80 N.Y.2d at 576, 607 N.E.2d at 788-89, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42. 
158. 81 N.Y.2d 731, 609 N.E.2d 117, 593 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1992). 
159. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 5 50-d(1) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992). 
160. Pedrero, 81 N.Y.2d at 732, 609 N.E.2d at 117, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 764. 
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claim."l61 The Court of Appeals held that the notice served on the 
city was untimely since it was served more than ten years after plain- 
tiff's The Court concluded, "[tlhus if such notice was a pre- 
requisite to this action, [the] Supreme Court properly dismissed the 
compIaint."163 
B. Other Opinions 
I. Continuous Treatment Doctrine 
Under the doctrine of continuous treatment, the statute of limita- 
tions is tolled until after the course of treatment. Continuous treat- 
ment includes the wrongful acts or omissions that have run 
continuously and are related to the same original condition of com- 
~ 1 a i n t . l ~ ~  The applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine re- 
quires that there be more than merely a continuing relationship 
between the physician and the patient.165 The underlying rationale is 
the existence of a continuing trust and confidence which warrants the 
tolling of the limitations period.l66 Thus, continuous treatment con- 
templates scheduled appointments for future visits and, absent a clear 
agency relationship, the doctrine cannot be imputed from one doctor 
to another.167 During the Survey year, two appellate divisions 
reached different decisions on the question of what constitutes a le- 
gally relevant relationship sufficient for imputation 
In Raymonde Pierre-Louis v. Ching- Yuan Hwa, '69 the Appellate 
Division for the Second Department was faced with the question of 
whether continuous treatment provided by others at the defendants' 
hospital was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The appellate 
division stressed that "a continued relationship must be shown be- 




164. See McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 405, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1 1  10, 452 
N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (1982) (quoting Borgia v. City o f  N.Y., 12 N.Y.2d 151, 189 N.E.2d 
777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962)). 
165. McDermott, 56 N.Y.2d at 405, 437 N.E.2d at 1110, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 353. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See Siege1 v. Wank ,  183 A.D.2d 158, 589 N.Y.S.2d 934 (3d Dep't 1992); 
Raymonde Pierre-Louis v. Ching-Yuan Hwa, 182 A.D.2d 55, 587 N.Y.S.2d 17 (2d Dep't 
1992). 
169. Raymonde Pierre-Louis, 182 A.D.2d at 55, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
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prolong the statute of limitations against the latter."l70 The appellate 
division concluded that the plaintiff had "failed to demonstrate the 
existence of a legally-relevant relationship between the defendants and 
the subsequently treating Downstate d0ctors."l7~ The court stated, 
"[tlhat the defendants and their successors were 'co-employees' of 
Downstate is insufficient for the imputation of the latter's continuous 
treatment to the former for the purpose of tolling the statute of 
limitations."172 
In Siegel v Wank,l73 the Appellate Division for the Third De- 
partment affirmed the supreme court's denial of a CPLR 3211(a)(5) 
motion to dismiss. On July 12, 1988, defendant Watson and defendant 
Wank performed dental implant surgery on the ~1aintiff.l~~ Plaintiff 
experienced various complications and underwent additional proce- 
dures with Dr. Watson.175 She then commenced an action for dental 
malpractice against the defendants and served Dr. Wank with a sum- 
mons and notice on February 15, 1991.176 He moved to dismiss on 
the grounds of statute of limitations.177 Plaintiff alleged that when she 
first experienced problems following the initial surgery, Dr. Watson 
told her that he had consulted with Dr. Wank who, in turn, "advised 
[Watson] to perform a surgical procedure to clean out the area 
around the implants."l7* Plaintiff also alleged that Dr. Watson con- 
sulted with Dr. Wank on a regular basis throughout the course of her 
treatment and that this constituted a legally relevant relationship suf- 
ficient for imputation The appellate division held that 
plaintiff had averred evidentiary facts, albeit hearsay, to raise a ques- 
tion of fact as to the applicability of the continuous treatment 
doctrine.180 
170. Id. at 59, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 19. 
171. Id. at 59, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 20. 
172. Id. 
173. Siegel, 183 A.D.2d at 158, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 934. 




178. Siegel, 183 A.D.2d at 160, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 936. 
179. Id. at 161, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 936. 
180. Id. 
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2. CPLR 214-c: Microwave Radiation Is 'Substance" and 214-c(4) 
Is Expansively Applied 
In Ford v. American Telephone Co.,l81 "a former navy member 
who allegedly contracted lymphoma as a result of exposure to micro- 
wave radiation while he was stationed aboard a navy vessel [from 
1965-19671 brought a personal injury action against the entities re- 
sponsible for the design, construction, manufacture, or installation of 
the on-board radar equipment."l82 
On motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court held . . . 
that: (1) microwave radiation was a 'substance' within the meaning 
of the statute extending the three-year statute of limitations for in- 
jury caused by the latent effects of exposure to a substance, and (2) 
the one year limitation on bringing an action after discovering 
cause of the injury applies only when the cause of the injury is 
discovered more than two years after the discovery of the existence 
of the injury and, thus, operates only to extend the three-year stat- 
ute of limitations. lS3 
3. Federal Law Governs Some Questions of m e n  a Federal Claim 
Accrues 
In Morse v. University of Vermont, lS4 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reminded the bench and bar that fed- 
eral law governs the question of when a federal claim accrues notwith- 
standing that a state statute of limitations is to be used.lg5 The court 
held that the plaintiff's action under a section of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. section 794 (1988), was governed by the state 
statute of limitations applicable to a personal injury action. In this 
respect, the practitioner should be alerted to 28 U.S.C. section 1658186 
which enacts a general four year statute of limitations respecting civil 
actions arising under Acts of Congress that do not specifically set 
forth a period of limitations. This provision applies only to causes of 
action arising under legislation that Congress enacts after December 
1, 1990.187 Thus, the new statute is not retroactive. Also, the new 
- - - - 
181. 154 Misc. 2d 894, 586 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992). 
182. Id. at 894, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 721. 
183. Id. 
184. 973 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1992). 
185. Id. at 125. 
186. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1658 (1992). 
187. Id. 
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statute does not consider whether there should be tolling provisions 
applicable to federal statutes of limitations and does not incorporate 
applicable state tolling provisions by reference. The practitioner is 
reminded that the new statute is not applicable in diversity cases 
where state limitation periods and tolling provisions are applied.lS8 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The most important subject matter jurisdiction decision rendered 
during the Survey year is the United States Supreme Court's opinion 
in American National Red Cross v. S. G. .I89 A blood recipient brought 
a state court action against the American National Red Cross to re- 
cover for AIDS allegedly caused by contaminated blood. Red Cross 
removed the suit to federal court. The United States Supreme Court, 
in a closely divided opinion, held that the Red Cross charter created 
original federal jurisdiction over suits involving the Red Cross.l90 
This decision has important implications for the New York practi- 
tioner because whenever a statute granting a federally chartered cor- 
poration the "power to sue and be sued" specifically mentions the 
federal courts, the law will be deemed to confer on federal district 
courts jurisdiction over any and all controversies to which that corpo- 
ration is a party. Since there are hundreds of federally chartered cor- 
porations, the plaintiff's lawyer who files his tort case in the Bronx 
Supreme Court may have the case removed to the United States Dis- 
trict Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan or 
White Plains. 
B. In Personam Jurisdiction 
There are several Survey year cases worthy of mention. One fed- 
eral district court has established special jurisdictional rules to handle 
mass tort litigation191 and several appellate divisions have issued im- 
portant opinions regarding long-arm jurisdiction and the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.192 In addition, there are many strict 
- 
188. For a fuller discussion of the new federal statute of limitations see David D. 
Siegel, The Statute of Limitations in Federal Practice, Including the New "General" One 
in Federal Questions Cases, 134 F.R.D. 481 (1991). 
189. 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992). 
190. Id. at 2465. 
191. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
192. See infra notes 207-11 and notes 224-26 and accompanying text. 
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compliance and summons cases1g3 and several instructive opinions re- 
garding the waiver of jurisdictional defenses.194 Also, we note the first 
decision discussing the Inter-American Convention on Letters 
Rogatory. 195 
I. Broad Jurisdiction Ruling in DES Cases 
In In re DES Ca~es,l9~ Judge Weinstein announced a new ap- 
proach to determining whether in personam jurisdiction exists over 
defendants in mass tort litigation. His approach rejects the time-worn 
territorial nexus approach.197 Judge Weinstein reasoned that once a 
plaintiff demonstrates that the state where a lawsuit is fded has an 
"adequate" interest to support jurisdiction, even if it is non-territorial, 
a prima facie case for jurisdiction can be made.198 Judge Weinstein 
also held that a defendant could avoid in personam jurisdiction if it 
could demonstrate the lawsuit would cause it "relatively substantial 
hardship."l99 
2. Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(I) 
In Bank of New York v. Strurn0r,~o0 the appellate division held 
that a New Mexico maker of a note was subject to in personam juris- 
diction in New York in an action to recover on the note. The defend- 
ant had signed the note in New Mexico and the proceeds of the note 
were payable in New York and to be used to finance the purchase of a 
New York limited partnership. The note was also secured by an 
agreement pledging the maker's shares in the limited partnership, and 
the pledge agreement provided that any question would be governed 
by New York l a ~ . ~ O l  The appellate division held that the totality of 
the defendant's acts, whereby he availed himself of the benefits and 
protection of New York law, demonstrated sufficient purposeful activ- 
ity in New York to constitute a transaction of business under CPLR 
302(a)(l). In Glass Contractors v. Target Supply and Display, Inc. ,202 
193. See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text. 
194. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text. 
195. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. 
196. DES cases, 789 F. Supp. at 552. 
197. Id. at 585. 
198. Id. at 587. 
199. Id. 
200. 179 A.D.2d 736, 579 N.Y.S.2d 124 (2d Dep't 1992). 
201. Id. at 736, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 124. 
202. 152 Misc. 2d 782, 587 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. App. Term, 2d & 11th Jud. Dist. 
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the appellate term reminded the bench and bar that, when reviewing 
default judgments, New York courts must limit their inquiry to ascer- 
taining whether courts of foreign jurisdictions possess personal juris- 
diction over the defendants pursuant to their long-arm statutes and 
not CPLR 302.203 In this sense, New York has a restricted long-arm 
statute that does not go as far as long-arm statutes of many other 
Finally, in Mareno v. Jet Aviation of America, Inc. ,205 the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reminded the bench and bar that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I I sanctions may be imposed on law- 
yers who fail to do their long-arm jurisdictional research.206 
3. Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(b) 
CPLR 302(b)207 permits the exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
in a matrimonial action or family court proceeding involving a claim 
for support, alimony, maintenance, a distributive award or other spe- 
cial relief. The party seeking such relief must be a New York resident 
or domiciliary and must further provide (1) New York was the mari- 
tal domicile of the parties before separation; or (2) the defendant 
abandoned the plaintiff in New York; or (3) the obligation to provide 
the relief accrued under the laws of New York; or (4) the obligation to 
provide such relief arose out of an agreement executed in New York. 
Interpretation of this statute has been characterized by a cautious at- 
tention to the due process limits lurking in the background. 
During the Survey year the Appellate Division, Third Depart- 
ment upheld long-arm jurisdiction and gave an expansive interpreta- 
tion to the issue of what constitutes the matrimonial domicile of the 
parties before their separation.208 Other appellate divisions have read 
1992). See also China Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Machine Corp., 126 A.D.2d 239, 513 
N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987) (Where a sister state's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is 
challenged in an action on a foreign judgment, the law of that state determines whether 
jurisdiction was properly asserted. This is true even if that state's long-am statute is at 
odds with our rule.). 
203. Glass Contractors, 152 Misc. 2d at 783, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 471. 
204. See David D. Siegel, The Afliction Known As Long Arm Jurisdiction, N.Y. L.J., 
May 31, 1988, at 5. 
205. 970 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1992). 
206. Id. at 1126. See also International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 
F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1989) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions applicable on 
plaintiffs attorney in the amount of $10,000 for failure to do jurisdictional research). 
207. See N.Y. CPLR 302(b) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
208. See Levy v. Levy, 185 A.D.2d 15, 592 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dep't 1993). 
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CPLR 302(b) more restrictively and the Court of Appeals is expected 
to clarify the different approaches.209 
In Levy v. Levy,210 the parties married in New York in 1970. 
They moved to Massachusetts in 1974 and to Texas in 1976. They 
reestablished their marital domicile in New York in August 1979 and 
moved to California in 198 1. In 1982, plaints returned to New York 
with her two daughters. Defendant moved to New York in 1987 and 
resided there until he moved to New Jersey in 1988. In the fall of 
1989, defendant moved to Washington where he still resides. He vis- 
ited New York on numerous occasions and often stayed with plaintiff 
and his daughters where the parties presented themselves to the com- 
munity as a family. The Third Department recognized that other ap- 
pellate divisions had restrictively construed the meaning of 
"matrimonial domicile" for purposes of CPLR 302(b), but held that 
there were sufficient contacts by defendant with New York to comply 
with constitutional due process concerns relating to the application of 
the ~tatute.~ll 
4. Strict Compliance Cases 
We again remind the bench and bar that courts require strict 
compliance for service of summons and complaint or summons and 
notice.212 This is important because in most courts, other than those 
subject to the new filing requirements,213 a defect in service dismisses 
209. See Richardson v. Richardson, 58 A.D.2d 861, 396 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1st Dep't 
1977); Lieb v. Lieb, 53 A.D.2d 67, 385 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1976); Paparella v. 
Paparella, 74 A.D.2d 106, 426 N.Y.S.2d 610 (4th Dep't 1980); Klette v. Klette, 167 
A.D.2d 197, 561 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1990). 
210. Levy, 185 A.D.2d at 15, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 480. 
211. Id. 
212. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey, supra note 34, at 123. Strict compli- 
ance is crucial in all courts where an action is deemed commenced by properly sewing 
the defendant with summons and notice or summons and complaint. Thus, in the New 
York civil, city, district and other courts not covered by the new filing law failure to meet 
the strict compliance requirements can result in a jurisdictional dismissal and if the stat- 
ute of limitations has expired the action will be dismissed and not receive the six month 
extension under CPLR 205 for recommencement of the action. In the supreme and 
county courts where an action is deemed commenced upon filing, the plaintiff is still 
required to comply with applicable service statutes in order to obtain jurisdiction over the 
defendant. If the plaintiff fails to comply with the statute and a defendant moves to 
dismiss for jurisdictional grounds, the action will be dismissed but even if the statute of 
limitations has run, plaintiff can file a second action. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney 
1990 & Supp. 1992). 
213. N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
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the action and if the dismissal occurs after the applicable statute of 
limitations has expired, there is no six-month grace period under 
CPLR 205(a).214 The lawyer must debrief the process server.215 
Most strict compliance cases arise in supreme court actions. 
Since the new filing laws are applicable in supreme court, it is possible 
that fewer jurisdictional defenses will be raised by defendants because 
there is little to gain by a dismissal of the plaintiff's action. Also, it is 
unlikely that plaintiffs will appeal jurisdictional dismissals in supreme 
court because it will be faster and cheaper to file a new action as per- 
mitted by CPLR 306-b(b).216 Nonetheless, we remind the reader that 
defense counsel frequently enjoy annoying counsel for plaintiffs. Fail- 
ure to adhere to the requirements of the strict compliance service stat- 
utes may require the plaintiff to file a new action, pay for a new index 
number and then properly re-serve the defendant. Why waste the 
time? Finally, we alert the practitioner to the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit's decision in Buggs v. Ehrnschwender,217 which re- 
minds the bar that long-arm jurisdiction in federal courts is frequently 
dependent upon whether the plaintiff strictly followed New York 
State statutory procedures for service of process.218 
5. Summons Practice 
In order to meet the requirement that the summons filed with the 
county clerk be served on a defendant within the required time pe- 
riod, the summons served must be exactly the same as the summons 
filed.219 Variations in summons could be fatal. In Scaringi v. Broome 
Realty C ~ r p . . , ~ ~ ~  the supreme court held that no action is properly 
commenced if either service of summons or the substance and content 
of the summons are not in compliance with the statutory mandate.221 
Also, in Santopolo v. Turner Construction the appellate divi- 
sion reminded the bench and bar that failure to obtain leave of court 
to add a new party to an action may be waived and is not fatal, even 
- - - - - - - - - 
214. See N.Y. CPLR 205(a) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
215. See Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service Under New York's "Nail and Mail" 
Statute, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1987, at 1. 
216. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b(b) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
217. 968 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1992). 
218. Id. at 1548. 
219. OSCAR G. CHASE, ET AL., CPLR MANUAL 5 3.13 (1986) 
220. 191 A.D.2d 223, 594 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1st Dep't 1993). 
221. Id. at 223, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 242. 
222. 181 A.D.2d 429, 580 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1st Dep't 1992). 
Heinonline - -  44 Syracuse L. Rev. 95 1993 
96 Syracuse Law Review pol .  4465 
though such failure generally renders service on the new party a 
C Jurisdiction Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
In Maureen S v. Margaret S. ,224 the appellate division, by Justice 
Miller, held that the family court properly invoked its emergency ju- 
risdiction powers pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act ("UCCJA").225 The appellate division affirmed the family court's 
decision to temporarily modify a custody award of another state. The 
appellate division also considered a broader question of the appropri- 
ate communicative procedures provided for by the UCCJA, and how 
in this case the New York family court did not utilize them to their 
D. Appearance and Waiver of Jurisdictional Defenses 
Several Survey articles have mentioned Addesso v. Shemtob.z2' 
That case held that defendants seeking to take advantage of jurisdic- 
tional challenges must rigidly abide by the requirements of CPLR 
321 1(e).228 During the Survey year two appellate divisions reminded 
the bar that valid jurisdictional objections will be waived by failure to 
raise them properly.229 In Wiesener v. Avis Rent-A-Car, I ~ c . , ~ J O  the 
Appellate Division, First Department held that failure to assert a spe- 
cific objection to long-arm jurisdiction in an answer barred the asser- 
tion in a motion for summary judgrnent.231 The appellate division 
stated, "[dlefendant, in its answer, asserted only a defense predicated 
upon improper service, which it later conceded to be without 
rne1it."~32 Similarly in Lauro v. Cr0nin,~3~ the Appellate Division, 
Third Department held that a personal jurisdiction defense of im- 
p p p p p p 
223. Id. at 429, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 755. 
224. 184 A.D.2d 159, 592 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't 1992). 
225. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 75-d(l)(c)(ii) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992). 
226. See Maureen S ,  184 A.D.2d at 165, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 59. 
227. 70 N.Y.2d 689, 512 N.E.2d 314, 518 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1987). 
228. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 62, at 98-100. 
229. See Wiesener v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 372, 582 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st 
Dep't 1992); Lauro v. Cronin, 184 A.D.2d 837, 584 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1992). 
230. Wiesener, 182 A.D.2d at 372, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 122. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 373, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 122. 
233. Lauro, 184 A.D.2d at 837, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 671. 
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proper service was waived where a pre-answer motion to dismiss did 
not include the defense. 
E. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory 
Prior Survey articles have discussed the Hague Convention and 
concluded that failure to comply with it will result in a dismissal of 
the plaintiff's action.234 In Torres v. Arocena,235 Justice Tompkins of 
the supreme court reminded the bench and bar that the United States 
is a signatory to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory 
and that failure to comply with the Convention's requirement that 
service of process abroad be made in accordance with the law of the 
state of destination preempts any inconsistent New York State service 
of process The bottom line is if the defendant resides in a 
country that is a signatory to the Convention, the plaintiff must make 
service in that country. The mandatory language in the Inter-Ameri- 
can Convention is comparable to that of the Hague Service Conven- 
tion which was discussed in Volkswagen Werk Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Schlunk 23' 
IV. DISCLOSURE CASES 
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals settled a conflict 
among the four appellate divisions and ruled that defense surveillance 
films made to undermine a plaintiff's personal injury claims must be 
disclosed.238 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that 
client phone records are not protected from a government subpoena 
on privilege grounds'239 and the Appellate Division, First Department 
held that law firm tax records are not discoverable after the firm 
breaks Also, several lower courts issued interesting opinions 
regarding the attorney-client privilege.241 
234. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1988 Survey, supra note 63, at 108-09. 
235. 155 Misc. 2d 52, 587 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992). 
236. Torres, 155 Misc. 2d at 52, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 495. 
237. 486 U.S. 694 (1988). 
238. See DiMichel v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 80 N.Y.2d 184, 604 N.E.2d 63, 590 
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1992). 
239. See United States v. John Doe, 959 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1992). 
240. Gordon v. Grossman, 183 A.D.2d 669, 584 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep't 1992). 
241. See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text. 
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A. Disclosure of Videotapes Ordered 
In DiMichel v. South Bufalo Railway Co. ,242 the Appellate Divi- 
sion, Fourth Department held that a defendant must turn over any 
surveillance tapes it intends to use at trial. The Fourth Department 
reasoned that although the tapes were material prepared for litigation 
they were discoverable on a showing "that the party seeking discovery 
has a substantial need of the materials in preparation of the case and 
is unable . . . to obtain [their] substantial equivalent by other 
means."243 The appellate division authorized qualified discovery. The 
Second Department reached a similar conclusion244 and the Third 
Department ruled that the plaintiff could await the trial to challenge 
the authenticity of the surveillance material~.24~ The First Depart- 
ment held that surveillance materials were discoverable because they 
were statements of the plaintiff and available under CPLR Section 
3 10 1 (e) during pre-trial inspection.246 
A unanimous Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge 
Wachtler, adopted the Fourth Department's rationale. Chief Judge 
Wachtler stated: 
Having considered the different approaches, we agree with the Sec- 
ond, Third and Fourth Departments that surveillance films should 
be treated as material prepared in anticipation of litigation, and as 
such, are subject to a qualified privilege that can be overcome only 
by a factual showing of substantial need and undue hardship.247 
Chief Judge Wachtler rejected defendant's argument that the 
plaintiff could tailor his testimony after viewing the surveillance mate- 
rial and noted that the material could be turned over after the plaintiff 
had been dep0sed.~48 
242. 80 N.Y.2d 184, 604 N.E.2d 63, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1992). 
243. See DiMichel v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 178 A.D.2d 914, 579 N.Y.S.2d 788 
(4th Dep't 1991). 
244. See Kane v. Her Pet Refrigeration, Inc., 181 A.D.2d 257, 587 N.Y.S.2d 339 
(2d Dep't 1992). 
245. See Careccia v. Enstron, 174 A.D.2d 48, 578 N.Y.S.2d 678 (3d Dep't 1992). 
246. Marte v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't 
1990). 
247. See DiMichel, 80 N.Y.2d at 196, 604 N.E.2d at 68, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
248. Id. at 197, 604 N.E.2d at 68, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
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B. Client Phone Records Not Protected 
In United States v. John Doe,249 the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that telephone records given to a law firm by its 
client are not protected from subpoena provided that the subpoena is 
not drafted so as to reveal the firm's legal strategy.250 The govern- 
ment had served a federal grand-jury subpoena that sought phone 
records from an unnamed client represented by the Manhattan law 
firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. The Court of Ap- 
peals ruled that the subpoena request did not violate the attorney 
work-product, attorney-client, or Fifth Amendment privileges of the 
client. Judge Amalya L. Kearse authored the opinion and was joined 
by Judge Jon 0. Newman and retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Thurgood Marshall in a unanimous opinion. 
C Law Firm Tax Records Not Available 
In Gordon v. Grossman,z" the Appellate Division for the First 
Department reversed an order granting disclosure of a portion of de- 
fendant's income tax returns in an action arising from the termination 
of a law finn partnership.252 The appellate division held that disclo- 
sure of tax returns is disfavored because of their confidential and pri- 
vate nature. The appellate division stressed that the party seeking 
disclosure must make a strong showing of necessity and demonstrate 
that the information contained in the returns is unavailable from 
other sources.2'3 
D. Other Discovery Opinions 
In an apparent issue of first impression, Justice Silberman held 
that an attorney who is a close friend of one spouse, but does not 
represent her, is protected by the attorney-client privilege and cannot 
be required to testify as to conversations about business and financial 
concerns and how to proceed with the case.254 Relying on the Court 
of Appeals decision in In re Priest v. Hennes~y,25~ Justice Silberman 
249. 959 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1992). 
250. Id. at 1158. 
251. Gordon, 183 A.D.2d at 669, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Nachman v. Nachman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 1993, at 1 (Sup. Ct.  N.Y.  Co.). 
255. 51 N.Y.2d 62,409 N.E.2d 983,431 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1980). 
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concluded in Nachman v. Nachman256 that an attorney-client rela- 
tionship could exist between the spouse and her attorney friend even 
though the latter perceived her role as one of an "ad~iser."~'~ In an- 
other issue of first impression, Justice Harold L. Wood ruled that an 
attorney must either reveal his client's name or remain silent and risk 
going to Justice Wood ruled that even though the client faced 
possible criminal prosecution as a hit and run driver, the attorney- 
client privilege was not applicable.259 His ruling goes beyond the 
Court of Appeals 1960 decision in Matter of Kaplan,260 where the 
Court held the name of a client, whose lawyer had told authorities 
about the bribery of city officials, did not have to be revealed because 
the client feared reprisals. 
During the Survey year, New York courts have issued many 
opinions analyzing recently enacted sanction rules for civil litiga- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Of particular interest is Justice Lebedeff's decision in In re 
Entertainment Partners Group Inc. v. Davi~,26~ which rejected the ar- 
gument that the language of CPLR 8303-a limits the recovery of costs 
and attorney's fees to $10,000 for an entire action. Also, Guarnier v. 
American Dredging Co.263 should be noted because it is the first time 
the Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's imposition of Part 130 
sanctions against an attorney. 
A. Background 
In 1986 the Court of Appeals held, in A.G. Ship Maintenance 
Corp. v. Lezak,264 that state courts do not have inherent power to im- 
pose sanctions on litigants and counsel. After A. G. Ship, the Legisla- 
ture passed CPLR 8303-a which provides for costs upon frivolous 
claims in actions to recover damages for personal injury, injury to 
256. Nachman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 1993, at 1. 
257. Id. 
258. In re D'Alessio, 155 Misc. 2d 518,589 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 
1992). 
259. Id. at 521, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 284. 
260. In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d, 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960). 
261. See Carlisle, Judicial Seminars 1992 Legal Update on New York Civil Practice 
(outline containing all sanction cases) (on file at Barclay Library). 
262. 155 Misc. 2d 894, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992). 
263. 79 N.Y.2d 846, 588 N.E.2d 92, 580 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1992). 
264. 69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 681, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986). 
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property or wrongful death actions.265 The statute contemplates a 
$10,000 monetary cap for each action.266 In 1989, Part 130 of the 
Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts became effective.267 
These rules, which apply to most New York State courts, permit the 
court at its discretion to sanction any party or attorney in any civil 
action or proceeding for frivolous conduct by imposing costs and rea- 
sonable attorney fees.268 In addition to, or in lieu of awarding costs 
and fees to the other side, the court may, at its discretion, impose 
financial sanctions upon any party or attorney for frivolous 
conduct.269 
Payments of sanctions by an attorney are deposited with the Cli- 
ents' Security Fund.270 Payment of sanctions by a party who is not an 
attorney are deposited with the clerk of the court for transmittal to 
the State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance.Z7l An award for 
costs and fees or sanctions may be sought by motion or by cross-mo- 
tion, or may be made by the court sua ~ p o n t e . ~ ~ ~  Part 130-1.2 pro- 
vides that an award of costs or an imposition of sanctions, or both, 
can be granted only upon a written decision setting forth the conduct 
on which the award or imposition is ba~ed.~'3 The decision must state 
the reasons why the court found the amount awarded or imposed to 
be appropriate.274 
Conduct is frivolous if: "(1) it is completely without merit in law 
or fact and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an ex- 
tension, modification or reversal of existing law; or (2) it is under- 
taken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or 
to harass or maliciously injure another."275 Part 130 also directs that 
when determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the 
court shall consider "the circumstances under which the conduct took 
place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual 
basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued 
265. See N.Y. CPLR 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
266. See N.Y. CPLR 8303-a(a). 
267. See 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (1989). 
268. See id. 
269. See id. 
270. Id. 
271. See id. 
272. See 22 NYCRR 130-l.l(d). 
273. See id. 5 130-1.2. 
274. See id. 
275. Id. 5 130-l.l(c)(l), (2). 
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when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent or should have 
been apparent to counse1."276 An award of costs or the imposition of 
sanctions, or both, shall be entered as a judgment of the The 
total amount of costs awarded and sanctions imposed must not exceed 
$10,000 in any action or proceeding.278 
B. Guarnier v. American Dredging Co. 
In Guarnier v. American Dredging Co. ,279 the Supreme Court for 
New York County imposed Part 130 sanctions on defendant's counsel 
sua sponte in the amount of $5,000.280 The trial judge had encoun- 
tered difficulty in compelling one of the jurors to serve because of his 
fears that jury service would put his employment at risk.281 The court 
persuaded the juror to appear and he was seated with the panel to be 
sworn en banc.2g2 "At this juncture the court inquired of counsel in- 
dividually whether the jury was satisfactory."283 Defendant's counsel 
responded that he did not think the juror should be forced to sit on 
the jury.284 The court excused the jury and informed defendant's 
counsel that costs would be assessed against him for plaintiff's coun- 
sel's time.285 
The supreme court later issued its written decision addressing 
defense counsel's conduct at the voir dire and concluded that the form 
of counsel's objection was an improper attempt to curry favor with 
the juror.286 The Appellate Division for the First Department recog- 
nized that the supreme court's assessment of costs in the amount of 
$5,000 was not supported by a hearing mandated by the sanction 
rules or by any specific findings of fact, but affirmed and reduced the 
amount to $l,000.287 The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds 
that "the reviewable record of the conduct of the appellant attorney 
during jury selection, which prompted the imposition of the sanction 
276. Id. $ 130-l.l(~)(2). 
277. See 22 NYCRR 130-1.2. 
278. See id. 
279. 79 N.Y.2d 846, 588 N.E.2d 92, 580 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1992). 
280. See Guarnier v. American Dredging Co., 172 A.D.2d 220, 567 N.Y.S.2d 725 
(1st Dep't 1991). 
281. Id. at 220, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 725. 
282. See id. at 221, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 726. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. Guarnier, 172 A.D.2d at 221, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 726. 
286. Id. 
287. 179 A.D.2d 392, 577 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1992). 
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over two months later, [was] devoid of the required basis for conclud- 
ing that the conduct . . . was 'frivolous' within the meaning of the 
sanctions r~le."~88 
C. Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis 
Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis289 raised an issue of 
first impression: Does the $10,000 specified in CPLR 8303-a290 apply 
to the case as a whole, or does it permit higher total costs in a case?291 
Justice Lebedeff held that the plain meaning of CPLR 8303-a permits, 
but does not necessarily require, that the $10,000 maximum apply to 
each prevailing party.292 She also found the statutory language per- 
mits consideration of a higher award to a given party for it supports a 
cost award even upon a "claim" and a number of claims may be 
raised against an individual party.293 Justice Lebedeff stated: 
Had the legislature not intended to allow consideration of costs as 
to multiple prevailing parties and multiple claims, even if the total 
were in excess of $10,000, the language would have addressed costs 
in the entire case, as is done in the text of the costs provisions in 
real property actions and in difficult or complex cases, which ad- 
dress additional costs only on the entire 'action' (CPLR §§ 8302 
and 8303), and in the sanctions provision of NYCRR 130-1.2 of 
the Rules of the Chief Judge, which contains reference to a maxi- 
mum amount of $10,000 in a single case.294 
The Lebedeff scheme would allow a judge to impose a one million 
dollar sanction on a plaintiff who had frivolously filed a complaint 
with ten claims against ten defendants. This result seems incompati- 
ble with the legislative purpose of CPLR 8303-a.295 
VI. THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals issued important 
opinions regarding the liability of law firms to third parties and to 
288. Guarnier, 79  N.Y.2d at 846, 602 N.E.2d at 232, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 194. 
289. 155 Misc. 2d 894, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.  Co. 1992). 
290. N.Y.  CPLR 8303-a(a) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
291. See Entertainment Partners, 155 Misc. 2d at 895-96, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 980. 
292. Id. at 901, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 984. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. at 901, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 984. 
295. See N.Y.  CPLR 8303-a. 
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former associates.296 
A. Liability of Law Firms to Third Parties 
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballan tine, 
Bushby, Palmer & Wood,297 the Court of Appeals ruled for the fist 
time that lawyers may be liable to third parties for negligent represen- 
tation "in the right circum~tances."29~ Pursuant to its client's instruc- 
tions, a defendant law firm furnished to a third party (Prudential) an 
opinion letter that assertedly contained false assurances. The firm 
had erroneously stated the outstanding balance on a first preferred 
fleet mortgage securing the debt as $92,885 rather than the correct 
sum of $92,885,000.299 As a result Prudential (the plaintiff) suffered 
significant losses and sued the law firm, contending that the firm's 
opinion letter had falsely assured it that the mortgage documents in 
question would fully protect its existing $92,885,000 security inter- 
est.300 Prudential acknowledged that it was not in privity with the 
law firm but argued that the relationship between them was suffi- 
ciently close so as to support a cause of action in negligence.301 Alter- 
natively, it maintained that the firm could be held liable to it, in 
contract, on a third party beneficiary theory.302 The Court of Ap- 
peals, speaking through Judge Titone, stated, "[wlhile a law firm sup- 
plying such a letter may have a duty running to the third parties, the 
record in this case does not support the conclusion that the assertion 
in the opinion letter caused plaintiff's loss."303 The Prudential Insur- 
ance Co. case should alert lawyers and law firms to the fact that they 
may be held liable for economic injury arising from negligent repre- 
sentation to third parties. 
B. Liability of Law Firms to Former Associates 
In Wieder v. Skala,3" the Court of Appeals, in an issue of first 
impression, reversed the lower courts and held that the plaintiff had 
296. See infra notes 297-311 and accompanying text. 
297. 80 N.Y.2d 377, 605 N.E.2d 318, 590 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1992). 
298. Prudential Ins., 80 N.Y.2d at 382, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833. 
299. See id. at 380, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832. 
300. See id. 
301. See id. at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 319-20, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832-33. 
302. See id. at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833. 
303. Prudential Ins., 80 N.Y.2d at 379, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832. 
304. 80 N.Y.2d 628, 609 N.E.2d 105, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1992). 
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stated a claim for relief either for breach of contract or for the tort of 
wrongful discharge. Plaintiff alleged he was fired by the defendant 
law firm for asking the firm partners to report another associate's mis- 
conduct to the Appellate Division Disciplinary Committee as re- 
quired under DR 1-103(A) of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility.305 The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that 
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action because, as an at-will em- 
ployee, the firm could terminate him without cause. The Court 
stressed that, in any hiring of an attorney as an associate to practice 
law with a law firm, there is implied an understanding that both par- 
ties will conduct the practice in accordance with the ethical standards 
of the profession.306 The Court noted that the plaintiff's failure to 
comply with DR 1-103(A) could result in suspension or disbar- 
ment.307 Thus, the defendant law firm, by insisting that plaintiff disre- 
gard the disciplinary rule, placed the plaintiff in the position of having 
to choose between continued employment and his own potential sus- 
pension and disbarment.308 The Court found this made the relation- 
ship of an associate to a law firm employer intrinsically different from 
that of employees in the ordinary "at-will" ~ase.~O9 
The Court of Appeals also rejected plaintiff's argument that the 
decision in Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord310 warranted a recognition of 
the tort of abusive discharge.311 The bottom line in Wieder is that law 
firms must be careful not to ignore whistleblowing associates. 
VIII. MOTION PRACTICE AND VENUE 
A. Motion to Reargue 
In PahI Equipment Corp. v K a s ~ i s , ~ ~ ~  the Appellate Division, 
First Department clarified the standards litigants should follow when 
filing motions for leave to renew and to reargue in trial courts. The 
appellate division stressed that a motion for leave to reargue pursuant 
305. See N.Y. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI- 
BILITY DR 1-103(A) (1993). 
306. See Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 636, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 752. 
307. See id. at 636-37, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756. 
308. See id. 
309. See id. at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. 
310. 75 N.Y.2d 95, 550 N.E.2d 410, 551 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1989). 
311. See Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 638-39, 609 N.E.2d 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757. 
312. 182 A.D.2d 22, 588 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dep't 1992). 
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to CPLR 2221313 "is addressed to the sound discretion of the court 
and may be granted only upon a showing 'that the court overlooked 
or misapprehended the facts or the law or for some reason mistakenly 
arrived at its earlier decision.' "314 The appellate division warned ad- 
vocates not to seek reargument merely to relitigate issues previously 
decided or to present arguments different from those originally as- 
serted.315 The appellate division also reminded the bar that a motion 
to renew under CPLR 2221 is intended to draw the court's attention 
to new or additional facts which, although in existence at the time of 
the original motion, were unknown to the party seeking renewal and 
therefore not brought to the court's attention.316 Finally, the appel- 
late division pointed out that sanctions could be applied under Part 
130 of the Uniform Rules against any litigant who fails to comply 
with CPLR 2221 and then imposed sanctions of $3,341.30 on plain- 
tiffs to cover costs and expenses incurred in opposing their motion to 
renew and reargue.317 
B. Venue 
Two appellate division decisions remind the bench and bar that 
some personal injury actions should not be tried in Bronx County.318 
In Johnson v. Greater New York Conference of Seventh Day Adventist 
Church'319 plaintiffs elected to try their personal injury action in 
Bronx The appellate division ruled that even though the 
accident occurred there, venue was improper because neither party 
resided in the Bronx.S21 The court also rejected a motion to retain 
venue in the Bronx on the grounds that justice would be promoted 
because the plaintiffs failed to supply the names, addresses, and occu- 
313. See N.Y. CPLR 2221 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992). 
314. Kassis, 182 A.D.2d at 27, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 11  (citing Schneider v. Solowey, 141 
A.D.2d 813, 529 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (2d Dep't 1988)). 
3 15. See id. 
316. See id. (citing Beiny v. Wynward, 132 A.D.2d 190, 522 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1st 
Dep't 1987), appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 994, 524 N.E.2d 879, 529 N.Y.S.2d 277 
(1988)). 
317. Id. at 33, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 14. 
318. See Johnson v. Greater N.Y. Conference of Seventh Day Adventist Church, 
181 A.D.2d 862, 581 N.Y.S.2d 414 (2d Dep't 1992); Delia v. Winter Bros., Inc., 183 
A.D.2d 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d 591 (3d Dep't 1992). 
319. Johnson, 181 A.D.2d at 862, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 414. 
320. Id. at 863, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 415. 
321. Id. 
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pations of the witnesses whose convenience would be effected.322 
In Delia v. Winter Brothers, Inc. ,323 the plaint* venued a wrong- 
ful death action in Bronx County even though the accident occurred 
in Rockland County.324 The plaintiff argued that venue was placed in 
the Bronx because the defendant purportedly resided there.325 The 
supreme court had granted a motion to change venue based on an 
affidavit submitted by the defendant which asserted his business ad- 
dress was in the Bronx, but he resided in Rockland County.326 
I am grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions from my 
colleagues of the bench and bar and in academia. I am particularly 
grateful to students in the 1993 graduating classes of Pace University 
School of Law and New York Law School for keeping me alert to new 
developments in New York Civil Practice. I also wish to express my 
sincere appreciation to the editors and members of the Syracuse Law 
Review for their patience and assistance. 
322. Id. 
323. 183 A.D.2d 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d 591 (3d Dep't 1992). 
324. Delia, 183 A.D.2d at 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 591. 
325. Id. at 1007, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 591. 
326. Id. at 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 591. 
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